Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda by Filatotchev, I. et al.
Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G. & Nakajima, C. (2013). Corporate governance and national institutions: 
A review and emerging research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4), pp. 965-986. 
doi: 10.1007/s10490-012-9293-9 
City Research Online
Original citation: Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G. & Nakajima, C. (2013). Corporate governance and 
national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
30(4), pp. 965-986. doi: 10.1007/s10490-012-9293-9 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15676/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:  
A REVIEW AND EMERGING RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
 
Abstract 
We present a critique of corporate governance research grounded in agency theory and 
propose that cross-national comparison of corporate governance should consider how the 
nature and extent of agency relationships differ across different institutional contexts. 
Building on prior governance studies grounded in sociology and organizational theory we 
argue that performance outcomes of boards of directors, ownership concentration and 
executive incentives may differ depending on the legal system and institutional characteristics 
in a specific country. Institutions may also affect the extent of complimentarity/substitution 
among different firm-level governance practices producing patterned variations in firm-level 
governance mechanisms. Our discussion suggests that researchers need to develop more 
holistic, institutionally embedded governance framework to analyze organizational outcomes 
of various governance practices. 
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Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed an explosion in studies of corporate governance around 
the world, including Asia. Much corporate governance research has been inspired by ideas 
from agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) and related normative, empirical and policy 
debates. The central premise of agency theory is that managers as agents of shareholders 
(principals) may engage in self-serving behavior that can be inconsistent with the 
shareholders’ wealth maximization principle (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). To constrain 
managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance 
mechanisms, including monitoring by boards of directors (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983) or large 
outside shareholders (e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988).  In 
addition, equity-based managerial incentives may help align the interests of agents and 
principals (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985, 1997). Finally, managerial opportunism 
can be constrained by external markets, such as the threat of takeover (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 
1988), product competition (Hart, 1983; Jensen, 1993), and managerial labor markets (Fama, 
1980). 
 These concepts from agency theory have informed a growing number of attempts to 
understand cross-national differences in corporate governance.  However, such approaches 
remain problematic because institutions modify the basic principal-agent relationship in ways 
that require specific contextualization.  Institutions matter for corporate governance because 
these create different sets of incentives or resources for monitoring, as well as embody 
different sets of values and normative understandings about the nature of the firm. The 
specific conditions of the “Anglo-Saxon model” constitute the exception rather than the rule 
when looking at Continental Europe, East Asia, India and emerging economies in other 
regions.  In most countries, ownership is substantially more concentrated.  Legal institutions 
differ widely, as do managerial career patterns and the salience of social norms around 
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shareholder value.  As Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro (2011:1) indicate: “One needs to 
understand the institutional framework in which organizations operate in order to understand 
the rationale for and consequences of specific corporate governance models, as well as the 
likelihood that specific governance reforms will be adopted and prove effective.”    
While previous studies have brought institutional theory to bear on questions of 
corporate governance, the comparative understanding of institutions has remained 
surprisingly thin (see also Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  Given the ‘under-contextualized’ nature 
of corporate governance research, a challenge remains to more explicitly understand and 
compare how the effectiveness of different corporate governance mechanisms varies across 
different organizational environments and institutional contexts (Aguilera, Filatotchev, 
Gospel, & Jackson,  2008).  Effectiveness may involve not only the protection of investors’ 
wealth, as in agency theory, but also fostering creation of new wealth and the fair distribution 
of wealth among stakeholders.1  The effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends 
on both their fit with the task environment of the organization (Thompson, 1967) and their 
legitimacy within wider sets of institutions that differ across societies and over time (Dobbin 
1994; Fligstein 2001; Roy, 1997; Scott, 2003).   These literatures advocate moving away from 
the focus on principals and agents as a universal phenomenon, and looking at the patterned 
variation of corporate governance in different settings.   
 In this Perspectives paper, we outline an emergent stream of research which argues 
that understanding how corporate governance differs around the world, including the Asia 
Pacific, requires a more rich and comparative view of institutions.  In particular, the 
effectiveness of well-known corporate governance practices differs across countries due to 
broader sets of complementarities among institutions within the particular social and political 
environment.  In developing our arguments, we do not attempt to present a comprehensive 
                                                 
1
 We see this context-specific view of effectiveness as distinct from agency theory, which often assume that 
these different elements are combined into a single long-term organizational objective of increasing shareholder 
value (see Jensen, 2002). 
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review of empirical results based on comparative corporate governance research. Likewise, 
we do not attempt to systematically elaborate a theory of how institutions shape the 
effectiveness of corporate governance.  Rather, we develop a set of theoretically grounded 
illustrations of how effectiveness is influenced by institutions with the objective of inspiring 
and informing an emerging comparative research agenda.   
Specifically, we illustrate how performance effects of corporate boards, ownership 
concentration and executive incentives may differ according to the legal system and 
institutional characteristics in a specific country. Institutions may also affect the extent of 
complementarity or substitution among different firm-level governance practices. Our 
discussion suggests that researchers need to develop a more holistic and institutionally 
embedded theoretical understanding of corporate governance to analyze the organizational 
outcomes of various governance practices. The contribution of this perspective is to go 
beyond more universalistic approaches, which apply models such as agency theory in the 
same universal manner in different institutional settings. As such, we contribute to emerging 
attempts to integrate institutional theory within corporate governance research (e.g., Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
From the Principal-Agency Dichotomy towards a Comparative  Institutional Analysis of 
Corporate Governance  
The principal-agency framework dominates research on corporate governance.  Here 
the efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms is studied from the perspective of 
shareholders, who invest resources and seek maximum return on their investment. This 
approach has emphasized the role of self-interested opportunism and “arm’s-length” 
contracting between shareholders and managers (Bruce, Buck, & Main, 2005). For example, 
well-designed incentive schemes should increase corporate productivity and value by better 
aligning top managers’ interests with those of shareholders (Hall, 2003).  Corporate 
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governance is thus conceptualized as a set of organizational practices aimed at monitoring 
and, if needed, restraining managerial discretion.   
The principal-agent relationship is often assumed to be universal and endemic to all 
forms of corporate organization.  Nonetheless, empirical research has cast doubt on whether a 
clear universal link exists between these corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance (e.g., Dalton et al, 2003).  For example, studies of executive pay in the US have 
focused on the hypothesis that agency problems can be solved by strengthening incentives 
linking CEO pay and performance (Hall, 2003),  despite continued controversy over the 
empirical evidence (see Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Kaplan, 2008; Wyld & Maurin, 2008).  
Comparative research has stressed the weaker effects of equity-based incentives in the UK 
and Germany (Bruce et al., 2005) or the absence of a link between high pay for performance 
sensitivity in executive pay and financial performance in Japan (Kubo, 2005).  Cross-
nationally comparative research has therefore also further sensitized researchers to how 
different sets of institutions modify the basic principal-agent relationship by providing 
different sets of incentives, resources, and understandings of corporate governance.  While a 
large literature has debated the strengths and weaknesses of agency theory, we highlight two 
issues relevant for cross-national comparisons.   
A first critique argues that agency theory is an ‘under-socialized’ approach that 
remains insensitive to how institutions shape the identities, interests and interactions among 
actors in corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  Agency theory has restricted its 
attention to mostly two actors (shareholders and managers). 2  Here institutions have played a 
relatively limited role.  For example, legal systems are argued to offer different levels of 
investor protection and thereby influence the level of agency costs faced by shareholders in 
different countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).  Sociological 
                                                 
2
 Stewardship and stakeholder theories remove some restrictive assumptions of the agency approach, yet do not 
provide a comprehensive research framework that links corporate governance with the broader context of 
different institutional environments (Aguilera et al., 2008; Yoshikawa & Phan, 2001). 
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strands of institutional theory go further to provide an alternative explanation for firm 
behavior in terms of “understandings that organizational actors share, independent of their 
interests” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 3).  Rather than making predictions based on self-
interested actors with bounded rationality, institutional theory identifies regulative, normative 
and cognitive mechanisms that shape the identities and interests of a wider set of 
stakeholders.  Different stakeholders may build coalitions to select and adapt socially 
legitimate and institutionally available corporate governance practices (Aoki, 2001).  For 
example, the agency conflict takes on very different forms across countries not only due to the 
different patterns of shareholder concentration but based on the different social identities of 
blockholders such as families, the state, banks, foundations or business groups (Jackson, 
2010).  Institutional theories have moved beyond the focus on how the law shapes agency 
conflicts, and looks now at how wider cultural, social, and political factors shape the cross-
national diversity of actors and settings in corporate governance (for a comprehensive review, 
see Aguilera & Jackson, 2010).   
A second and closely related point is that the notion of effectiveness within agency 
theory is too narrow to be applied to corporate governance in very different settings.  In fact, 
the effectiveness of different corporate governance practices depends strongly on their fit with 
the broader organizational environment (Aguilera et al., 2008).  The strategic salience of 
resources differs across organizations and creates different demands on governance.  For 
example, corporate governance performs very different functions across the life cycle of an 
organization and helps to explain the different salience of certain practices between different 
types of firms (Filatotchev, Toms & Wright, 2006). The alternative ‘open-system’ approach 
suggests that corporate governance practices are interdependent with the diversity, 
fluctuations, and uncertainties of their environment, and rejects universalistic ‘context-free’ 
propositions (see Aguilera et al., 2008).  The incentives and resources available for 
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monitoring are constituted in relation to particular institutional settings, which also shape 
managerial behavior through shared cognitions and norms.  Here corporate governance 
practices are effective only in relation to a wider configuration of organizational variables—
thus shifting the focus of corporate governance research toward a more holistic context of 
wealth creation and protection, rather than only agency costs.3     
In understanding the contingent nature of effectiveness in corporate governance, the 
concept of institutional complementarities offers a way to understand how various corporate 
governance elements may work more effectively in certain combinations and thus give rise to 
institutionally diverse forms (Aoki, 2001; Schmidt & Spindler, 2004). For example, as we 
discuss later in the paper, executive compensation may be an effective incentive alignment 
mechanism, but only when supported by a vigilant and independent board. By enabling and 
constraining different coalitions among stakeholders, corporate governance institutions may 
also yield comparative advantages for certain types of organizations at the expense of others.  
Furthermore, complementarities within a given institutional context may also be a source of 
path-dependence, where organizations are locked-in to certain sets of governance 
arrangements and may have difficulty in switching to alternative ways of organizing (Sydow, 
Schreyögg & Koch 2009).  Therefore, the appropriateness and effectiveness of the specific 
mechanism may depend on the institutional context within which the firm operates and the 
extent of their conformity to the legitimized norms and expectations prevailing in that market.   
Table 1 provides a summary of the main points of departure between mainstream 
agency-based approaches and an emerging comparative institutional approach to corporate 
governance that is grounded in organizational sociology. This new approach is aimed at a 
better understanding of the interdependence between governance mechanisms and the 
organizational and institutional environments in which these practices are conducted.  This 
                                                 
3
 Similarly, Williamson (1991: 277) suggests that mainstream corporate governance research is “too preoccupied 
with issues of allocative efficiency … to the neglect of organizational efficiency in which discrete structural 
alternatives were brought under scrutiny.” 
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view implies that corporate governance practices do not have a direct and linear effect on 
performance. Rather, performance effects are contingent on a number of firm-level and macro 
institutional factors that are not accounted for in the vast majority of studies. In the following 
sections, we discuss these important contingency factors and their potential effects on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of specific governance mechanisms. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
As Table 1 indicates, comparative institutional approaches to corporate governance 
framework challenge a number of key assumptions of traditional agency theory approaches. 
Comparative institutional approaches broaden the research focus beyond the dominant 
manager-shareholder dichotomy to consider other important organizational stakeholders and 
the effects of institutional environments on the firm-level governance mechanisms. The 
organizational problem of corporate governance is no longer conceived as a universal agency 
conflict but recognizes the diverse nature of agency conflicts across institutional settings.  
Rather than applying a universal set of corporate governance remedies, it is recognized that 
institutions shape the effectiveness of different corporate governance solutions in complex 
ways through the availability of functional equivalents or via unintended consequences of 
governance measures in a particular context.  Consequently, it moves away from a context-
free hypotheses and implicit focus on the U.S. or UK institutional environment both 
empirically and as a normative benchmark.  By contrast, comparative approaches aim at 
understanding how different formal and informal institutions can “contextualize” agency 
conflicts identified by previous studies. This departure from a universalistic conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders and the recognition of potential differences 
between the extent and nature of agency conflicts in various institutional environments allow 
development of a more holistic approach to governance problems and their potential remedies 
that take into account possible moderating roles of national institutions. Finally, a 
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comparative approach has important implications for public policy agendas that have 
dominated political agendas in the post-Enron era. More specifically, it rejects a universalistic 
idea of effective regulation through law and codes addressed to abstract market actors in favor 
of a more socially embedded view of how regulatory meanings and practices are embedded in 
wider social networks, formal associations of stakeholders and professional communities of 
practice.   National institutions thus mediate the impact of regulation in ways that highlight 
possibilities of functional equivalence or unintended consequences of such initiatives.   
Corporate Governance and Legal Institutions 
Institutional theory emphasizes that legal rules and norms form an important element 
of national institutional systems. A key example in recent years is the major stream of 
literature examining the role of legal origins (La Porta et al, 2000).  This research shows how 
different legal traditions (e.g., common versus civil law) are linked to the levels of investor 
protection, which, in turn, shape agency relationships by influencing the power of 
shareholders vis-à-vis the board, as well as the relative influence of minority versus large 
shareholders.  However, understanding legal institutions in terms of the dichotomous 
categories of common law versus civil law systems has been widely critiqued as too simplistic 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Coffee, 2001; Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems & 
Singh, 2009). 
Institutional theorists extend this research by examining how the influence of the law 
on corporate governance is itself embedded within a wider institutional environment of a 
country, in particular its regulatory framework.  For example, in addition to various ‘hard 
laws’, the influence of voluntary codes and various forms of ‘soft law’ are gaining 
significance, such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, or self-regulatory initiatives for corporate social responsibility (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazura, 2004; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). Likewise, large variation exists in 
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the degree to which law on the books is effectively enforced by the courts or other state 
agencies across countries.  As Zhou & Peng (2010: 360) argue, “Cross-country differences in 
the legal origin, exchange scope, government capability, and political power distributions lead 
to the heterogeneity of countries’ legal developments”. Building on the existing research, this 
section focuses on how various national laws define the relationship between a company, its 
directors and shareholders and how this affects the nature and extent of potential conflicts of 
interest and the effectiveness of governance solutions. 
Mainstream corporate governance research begins from a universal notion of 
shareholders as principals and managers as agents of the shareholders.  Most legal remedies to 
the agency problem lie within either strengthening the accountability of the board (for 
example, increasing board independence through more independent (non-executive) directors 
on board), or promoting greater shareholder engagement by providing rights for shareholders 
to exercise control by challenging managerial decisions in the context of the Annual General 
Meetings of shareholders (AGMs) or through the courts. However, a closer look at different 
legal systems shows that the agency relationship itself is constituted in law, but on the basis of 
very different approaches to defining the rights and responsibilities of shareholders and 
directors.     
Profound differences remain in the rights and responsibilities of shareholders as 
principals.  For example, Japanese company law confers wider decision making powers to the 
shareholders meeting relative to the US state corporate laws. Dividend payments, the 
repurchase of shares and directors’ remuneration all require shareholders’ approval at the 
annual general meeting in Japan. Furthermore, shareholders can propose amendments of 
article of incorporation without proposal by the board of directors, while it is impossible in 
the United States (Shishido, 2007).  Nonetheless, a majority of Japanese shareholders have 
historically been long-term strategic investors, including other non-financial corporations, 
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rather than institutional investors, and do not use their potential influence to promote the 
financial interests in line with fiduciary duties to principals (Aoki, Jackson & Miyajima 
2007).   
Similarly, national corporate laws confer authority on directors and interpret their role 
as the ‘legal agents’ of the shareholders is very different ways (Davies, 2008).  For example, 
in contrast to the corporate governance debate prevalent in economics and finance research, 
corporate law in many jurisdictions regulates the actions of the board of directors as a 
collective entity and defines their duties in relation to the company itself, rather than the 
shareholders.  This is not surprising as allowing the recognition of directors’ duties owed to 
shareholders individually would undermine ‘the collective nature of the shareholders’ 
association in a company’, and the fundamental rule that ‘the duties are owed to and are 
enforceable by the company’ (Davies, 2008: 480). The interests of the company, in turn, go 
beyond the immediate financial interests of shareholders and reflect a more subtle idea of 
shareholders’ interests being interdependent with a wider set of stakeholders’ objectives 
(Parkinson, 2003).  Specifically, the UK company law defines the company as a private 
association of shareholders, but also applies a notion of ‘enlightened’ shareholder value that 
reflects a broader public interest in as much as the company must consider the wider interests 
of stakeholders (Keay, 2011).  By contrast, German corporate law takes a more explicitly 
constitutional view of the corporation as an entity separate from any particular group, and 
requires different stakeholder groups such as employees to be explicitly represented on the 
board (Donnelly et al., 2000).   
In the US, no federal corporation law exists, and each state specifies the basic 
elements of the corporation in its corporation statutes.  Most state corporation laws recognize 
that management power lies in the board of directors, who owe broad obligations to act in the 
corporation’s best interests (Solomon & Palmiter, 1994; Keay, 2011).  This approach is also 
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found in both common law jurisdictions of Southern and East Asia, and in jurisdictions 
inheriting “civil law” traditions, such as Japan (Nakajima, 1999). However, the 2002 legal 
reform allowed Japanese companies to choose between different structures of the board of 
directors, and lead to vast differences in the extent the board is made up of corporate insiders 
or also represent independent outside directors along the Anglo-American model (Nakajima, 
2007). 
By looking beyond a universal “manager-shareholder” dichotomy, these examples 
show that the basic principal-agent problem is always embedded within legal institutions that 
construct and legitimate the relationship between shareholders, the board, and the wider 
interests of the company in different ways.  For example, Deakin & Singh (2008) show that 
differences in legal environments shape agency conflicts depending on how legal institutions 
treat duties company directors owe to their company.   
A key implication is that legal systems may, in turn, strongly influence the 
effectiveness of different internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, including 
the market for corporate control.  Again, agency theory suggests a universal set of remedies 
that can mitigate agency conflicts within the firm, such as independent boards, shareholder 
engagement with managers, etc. However, the effectiveness of these governance measures 
depends crucially on how governance remedies are translated into legal options available to 
various groups of stakeholders.  Likewise, legal institutions vary across countries with regard 
to how the framework of rules strikes a balance between constraining the potential abuse by 
managers of their powers, while avoiding undermining the efficiency gains from having a 
strong centralised management (Davies, 2008). 
A clear example of diverse legal institutions concerns the market for corporate control.  
Whereas UK corporate law reserves shareholders the fundamental right of decision and thus 
binds directors to neutrality in the face of a takeover bid, US law allows for a more active role 
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of the board toward unsolicited bids and allows a greater scope of potential defensive actions 
(see Jackson, 2010).  Meanwhile, Japan has largely followed US legal norms in allowing 
board discretion in response to takeover bids, but has gone a step further in elaborating a legal 
norm of the abuse of the rights of a bidder and enterprise value in ways that take account of 
wider stakeholder relationships (Whittaker & Deakin, 2009).  Even these ‘similar’ legal 
norms have shaped the effectiveness of takeover markets in different ways that vary according 
to the wider institutional context—US firms facing an active but highly contested market with 
high share price premiums, whereas Japanese firms face a less active market but one more 
effectively focused on poorly performing companies (Jackson & Miyajima, 2008). 
The delicate balance between managerial autonomy and shareholder rights is struck by 
focusing primarily on providing remedies for breaches of directors’ duties in regard to 
illegality, fraud, gross negligence and conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, in line with the 
different conceptions of directors’ duties to the company, significant differences exist in how 
directors’ duties are enforced as corporate governance solutions even within both civil and 
common law jurisdictions respectively. For example, although the overhaul of the UK 
company law in 2006 introduced a procedure for derivative claim, to safeguard against 
unwarranted shareholder activism, it requires a shareholder to obtain the court’s consent to 
proceed with the claim. By contrast, in many US states, shareholders are more successful in 
taking derivative actions against managers (Hertig, 2004). 
Some scholars have explained the lack of litigation outside the US by focusing on 
cultural and societal reasons (Kawashima, 1963; 1979). Others have identified institutional 
barriers, such as ineffective law enforcement institutions combined with high costs, 
insufficient availability of courts, judges and lawyers, which often deter people from 
considering litigation as a realistic governance enforcement option (Haley, 1978), especially 
in Asia and South-East Asia. As an example, Japan introduced a fixed rate for the filing fee of 
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shareholder derivative actions regardless of the damages sought and allowed the award to the 
successful shareholder plaintiffs damages for time and money spent on bringing the suit, in 
addition to the recovery of legal fees afforded prior to the revision (West, 2001). In order to 
reduce the risk of derivative suits, Japanese companies created the post of “shikkō yakuin” 
(executive officers), who had decision making powers but without being members of the 
board, and cut down the size of the boards.  
The effectiveness of using courts as an enforcement mechanism in corporate 
governance depends to a large measure on the extent to which the legal system in a particular 
country is prepared to consider cases of failed business decisions, misguided strategy and 
other managerial mistakes (see, for example, Ramseyer & Nakazato, 1999, on Japan; Baum, 
1996, on Germany; Law Commission 1999 and Nakajima, 1999, on English and other 
common law jurisdictions in Southern and East Asia; and Palmiter, 2006, on the US). 
Generally speaking, with the exception of fraud, illegality, gross negligence or conflicts of 
interest, shareholders have difficulties with taking directors to court for breaching their duty 
of care owed to the company (Hertig, 2004). What agency theory takes for granted in terms of 
shareholder rights may be difficult to exercise in practice.  
In sum, this discussion clearly shows that it is important to recognize that national 
legal systems have a very strong impact on how the rights of principals and the duties of 
directors are defined and executed, as well as how potential conflicts and breaches of 
directors’ responsibilities are dealt with. What traditional agency-grounded research has 
considered as a universal set of conflicts between managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals) may have a wide range of interpretations within different legal regimes. More 
importantly, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms, such as shareholder engagement 
and proactive involvement of independent board members is also underpinned by legal 
frameworks in different countries, including corporate laws. This integration of legal and 
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economics perspectives represents a significant departure for non-contextualized, traditional 
agency framework since it shows that the firm’s governance is strongly embedded within the 
fabrics of national laws, and this argument extends to a variety of corporate governance 
practices which so far have been considered as universal principles of “good governance”. 
The Governance Roles of Dominant Shareholders and Investor Protection 
Most corporate governance research is focused on corporations with diffused 
ownership, as commonly found in the US or UK.  Recent literature has sought to extend 
agency theory to understand contexts dominated by concentrated ownership (see discussion in 
Filatotchev, Zhang & Piesse, 2011). Blockholding is an important but diverse phenomenon in 
Asia, which includes families (e.g. Taiwan), state agencies (e.g. China), banks (e.g. Japan) or 
complex inter-corporate groups involving all of these elements (e.g. Korean chaebols).  
Agency theory ascribes a somewhat ambivalent role to concentrated ownership, since 
concentrated ownership may reduce agency costs related to the separation of ownership and 
control, but also  lead to new conflicts arising between majority and minority shareholders 
(see Hansmann, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).   Here a potential trade-off exists between 
the monitoring incentives and entrenchment through rent-seeking effects associated with 
concentrated shareholding. 
This trade-off is well established in the literature, and prior studies associate an 
effective balance between the two types of behavior with the firm’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics such as a phase in the life-cycle, patterns of innovation, etc. In terms of 
monitoring, greater concentration of cash-flow rights in the hands of large-block shareholders 
leads to greater incentives to monitor and alignment with the interests of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000).  In terms of rent-seeking, large-block shareholders may 
abuse their power and try to extract a control premium at the expense of other shareholders, 
and this opportunistic behavior would deter outside investment and negatively affect the 
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firm’s value.  A fast growing literature now concerns these so-called ‘private benefits of 
control’ (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988).  This issue is particularly 
important in countries with relatively low legal protection of minority investors and thus 
opportunity for extensive expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders. This expropriation may take various forms, such as related-party transactions, use 
of transfer pricing, assets stripping and other forms of ‘tunneling’ of revenue and assets from 
firms (see Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998, and La Porta et al., 2000). As a result, the primary 
agency problem in this institutional context is not the failure of professional managers to satisfy 
the objectives of diffused shareholders, but rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
the controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 A comparative institutional approach to corporate governance suggests going one step 
further in understanding the effectiveness of blockholding as something that dependents on 
additional institutional variables.  In particular, the incentive/entrenchment trade-off 
associated with concentrated share ownership depends on both legal institutions regulating 
minority shareholders and the wider sets of social norms shaping the identities and behavior 
of large owners.  The importance of institutions can be illustrated within the substantial body 
of research focused on family ownership, especially in the environment of emerging and less 
developed economies (Claessens et al., 2000). These firms constitute a large proportion of 
listed companies in a number of countries in East Asia and India (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 
2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005). Here corporate control is largely dependent on a pyramid 
ownership structure with equity cross-holding amongst associated firms.  While family-
owned business has been the subject of numerous studies (see Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse & 
Lien. 2007; Young et al., 2008, for a review), the results on the effectiveness of family 
ownership in corporate governance are largely inconclusive.  
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Some evidence suggests that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities 
compared to diffused shareholders, especially when this is combined with family control over 
management and the boards of firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Since owners in the current 
generation have the tendency and obligation to preserve wealth for the next, family firms 
often possess longer time horizons compared to non-family firms (Bruton et al., 2003; 
Dhandirek & Tang, 2003).  Heugens, Essen & Oosterhout (2009) also find a positive 
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance in their meta-
analysis of studies in Asia. Thus, family firms represent a special class of large shareholders 
that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, and provide powerful 
checks and controls over managerial opportunism.  
Other evidence suggests that family owners may create conflicts between dominant 
and minority shareholders, which they call a “principal-principal” form of agency conflict 
(Young et al., 2008). Governance problems associated with family control are typically 
related to the increased likelihood of the abuse of power (Jiang & Peng, 2011). Research from 
North America (e.g. Morck et al., 1988, Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999), India (Vissa, Greve & 
Chen, 2010) and South-East Asia (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2005; 2007) provides evidence of 
the negative effect of a controlling family on corporate performance. Here family interests 
may dominate over the interests of non-family shareholders, since the concentration of 
personal and family wealth in family-controlled firms normally creates a preference for 
wealth distribution towards dominant owners over other dimensions of firm performance, 
such as maximization of dividend payments to outside shareholders (Carney & Gedajlovic, 
2002). Similarly, a high overlap between the controlling family and management in certain 
settings may also lead to weak monitoring and render the opportunity for shareholder 
expropriation commonplace (Filatotchev et al., 2005). Finally, family control tends to shield a 
firm from the disciplinary pressure of the market for corporate control since concentrated 
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share ownership reduces the probability of a hostile take-over (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
Kintana & Makri, 2003).  While such protection may enhance investments in firm-specific 
capital by stakeholders, it may also contribute to managerial entrenchment and ineffective 
patterns of organization – thus making the performance effects ambiguous.   
The comparative institutional perspective summarized in Table 1 helps to resolve 
these contradictory arguments by suggesting that whether or not concentrated ownership 
promotes effective corporate governance may depend on the presence or absence of various 
types of national institutions.  For example, Zhou & Peng (2010) theorize that whether the 
impact of family ownership and control on firm value is good, bad or irrelevant depends on 
the level of shareholder protection embodied in the legal and regulatory institutions and these 
vary across countries. They suggest that in countries with less developed institutions more 
control through a family CEO or pyramid structure may afford controlling families more 
opportunities to expropriate funds from minority shareholders (see also Young et al., 2008). 
In addition, institutional environments characterized by informal networks based on trust, 
reputation considerations may be a powerful factor that restrains family owners’ opportunism 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011).  
 Again, these arguments show that the diversity of formal and informal institutions 
across countries may significantly shape the nature and extent of agency conflicts on a firm 
level. In countries where minority shareholders’ interests are not adequately protected by 
national law, regulation and reputational considerations, agency problems on a firm level may 
shift from the conventional manager-shareholder conflict to potential goal incongruence 
among shareholders themselves. At the same time, far from being a solution to principal-
agent conflicts, ownership concentration may lead to a new type of agency problems 
described as a principal-principal conflict (Young et al., 2008). 
Executive Compensation Debates and Informal Institutions 
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Executive compensation has become one of the most hotly debated topics within 
corporate governance research. As Bruce et al (2005: 1493) indicate, “In recent years, 
literature on executive remuneration has grown at a pace rivaled only by the growth of 
executive pay itself.”  Most agency theoretical research assumes that pay systems aligning the 
incentives of managers with those of shareholders will help firms operate more efficiently and 
perform better.  As Jensen & Murphy (1990: 242-243) observe, “Agency theory predicts that 
compensation policy will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s objective. The 
objective of shareholders is to maximize wealth; therefore agency theory predicts that CEO 
compensation policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth”. The key metric 
associated with positive organizational outcomes is pay-performance sensitivity (Bruce et al., 
2005).  In response, companies around the world have increasingly moved from a fixed pay 
structure to remuneration schemes that are related to performance and include a substantial 
component of equity-based incentives.  
A large empirical literature in the US and UK has examined the organizational 
outcomes of different executive pay components, such as cash pay (salary and bonus), long-
term incentives (e.g. executive stock options) and perquisites (pension contributions, 
company cars, etc).  Although executive incentives are increasingly considered as an 
important, “non-coercive” element of corporate governance, the structure, size and 
effectiveness of executive compensation schemes in different countries remain very diverse.  
Table 2 illustrates this diversity through a breakdown of CEO compensation packages in the 
largest companies around the world. For example, in the U.S., incentive plans account for a 
lion share (60 percent) of the total compensation, whereas base salary and cash bonuses 
provide only 23 and 17 percent of the total respectively. In Japan, 71 percent of the total 
executive compensation is related to base salary, with executive equity plans accounting only 
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for 17 percent. European countries are somewhere in between, with executive remuneration 
more evenly distributed among the three components. 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
Marked differences also exist in terms of the total value of executive compensation. For 
example, Thomas (2009) reports results of a CEO pay survey around the world by Tower 
Perrin and shows that total CEO pay in Germany, Sweden and China amounted to 51, 44 and 
21 percent of CEO pay in comparable firms in the U.S.  
This diversity in the structure and levels of executive compensation reflects the 
distinct institutional contexts in which these pay packages are conceived, implemented and 
monitored—factors often ignored in agency theory.  Executive pay packages are not only 
governed by economic efficiency or the reduction of agency costs, but must be socially 
legitimate within specific and sometimes contested social contexts.  Institutional theory 
suggests that executive pay systems are socially embedded practices shaped by regulatory 
institutions, but also subjected to social norms of professional groups and diffuse through 
processes of imitation and emulation of taken-for-granted social forms.   
  In the U.S., stock-based executive compensation is so prevalent to have achieved 
“taken for granted status” (Sanders & Boivie, 2004: 171). From an agency perspective, U.S. 
investors would appear to place great reliance on this measure as the preferred incentive 
alignment mechanism.  Still, much debate remains about whether these pay packages are, in 
fact, sensitive to performance at all (see Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Kaplan, 2008; Wyld & 
Maurin, 2008).  Understanding their prevalence in the US requires looking at wider sets of 
institutions such as their favorable tax treatment under U.S. accounting rules, as well as the 
non-egalitarian social ethos of the U.S. and normative assumptions about managers being 
motivated by self-interest and extrinsic rewards. These pay packages are likely to be 
ineffective in reducing agency costs if supporting complementary institutions are absent or 
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weak, such as independent directors and shareholder “say on pay.”  For example, high pay 
levels and equity-based incentives are associated with high levels of institutional investors’ 
ownership and absence of strong and “patient” blockholders (Fernandes et al., 2010).  
Institutional investors often fail as effective monitors and adopt more pro-management 
stances if they are dependent on other sorts of business from corporations, such as managing 
corporate pension funds (Davis & Kim, 2007).  Meanwhile, the institutionalization of stock 
options may have other unintended effects.  For example, the size of stock options has a very 
strong influence on the prevalence of earnings restatements (Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 
2004; Denis, Hanouna & Sarin, 2006).   
Another regulatory institution shaping executive pay has been the role of disclosure 
and transparency (Conyon & Murphy, 2000).  For example, a universal requirement to 
disclose the structure and level of executive compensation in the U.S. was hoped to slow the 
increase in executive pay, with the publicity about high pay working against abuses. 
However, Hall (2003: 32) argues that “once executives began to see more clearly how much 
their peers were making, they wanted more – and boards granted more”. Thus, whilst 
disclosure was generally aimed at curbing excesses, it also had unintended consequences by 
creating a fertile ground for abuses.   For example, DiPrete, Eirich & Pittinsky (2010) have 
shown the network diffusion of CEO pay, where a small and shifting fraction of CEOs 
regularly “leapfrog” their compensation benchmarks (after controlling for performance).  
Thereby, governance failures in individual firms propagate through corporate networks via 
the benchmarking system used to raise executive salaries.  These deviant events produce 
subsequent “legitimate” pay increases for others.   
Outside the U.S., executive stock options often contradict prevailing institutionalized 
norms and coalitions of interest (Bruce et al., 2005; Buck & Sharhrim, 2005).  When investors 
rely on reputational considerations rather than formal equity-based incentives in evaluating 
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the probability of self-serving behavior of managers, the presence of executive share options 
would have relatively lower weight in terms of the firm’s expected cost of capital (Bhagat, 
McDevitt & McDevitt, 2010).  For example, in German and Japanese corporate governance 
systems, monitoring has been based on relationship-oriented banks rather than an active 
market for corporate control (Aoki, 2001).  The long-term nature of bank-firm relationships 
may also complement a more active role for other stakeholders, such as employees, as 
employees’ investments in firm-specific capital are protected from “breaches of trust” (Aoki, 
2001).  Here, the applicability of equity-based incentives is generally restricted compared to 
the U.S., as clearly indicated in Table 2.  However, in cases where these institutions have 
weakened, stock options have also taken root in these countries, albeit in greatly modified 
form, such as smaller size options in Japan (Aoki et al., 2007) or more regulated holding 
periods for the exercise of options in Germany.  Thus, stock options have been a largely 
symbolic adoption as a signal to foreign shareholders but remained largely decoupled from 
other organizational practices (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Sanders & Tuschke, 2006).   
The broader point is that institutional factors may have a significant impact on the 
roles of executive compensation schemes as well as their effectiveness in re-aligning interests 
of managers and shareholders. This extends our understanding of the governance roles of 
executive compensation beyond the confines of agency framework. Research in other Asian 
countries have also shown stakeholder influence on executive pay in South Korea (Kato, Kim, 
& Lee, 2005) or the importance of relationship and network influences in China (Firth, Fung, 
& Rui, 2006; Kato & Long, 2006), even despite newer elements of ‘‘stock market 
capitalism’’ after the Chinese economic reforms. Buck, Liu & Skovoroda (2008: 4) suggest 
that “Chinese institutions (including culture as an informal institution) may have inhibited the 
adoption of long-term incentives in the form of equity-based pay, and thus reduced the 
responsiveness of pay to share price performance.” 
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In sum, institutional analysis extends traditional agency framework further by 
suggesting that the effectiveness of executive compensation is shaped by a complex set of 
institutional factors that tend to differ across countries. In economies characterized by dispersed 
share ownership, less significant roles of stakeholders and higher tolerance to income 
inequality, executive incentives are a legitimate instrument of corporate governance aimed at 
aligning interests of managers and shareholders (Hall, 2003), even where the effectiveness 
remains questionable.  However, in societies with strong egalitarian tendencies, powerful 
stakeholders and reputational concerns that frame managerial behavior, the effectiveness of 
executive compensation must be seen in a different context.  Again, these arguments suggest 
that national institutions represent important contingency factors that may influence the 
adoption and effectiveness of firm-level governance practices, contrary to the universalistic 
framework that until recently dominated agency-grounded research.  
Comparative Institutional Analysis as an Emerging Research Agenda 
This paper suggests scholars interested in corporate governance in Asia or in broader 
comparative perspective should make greater use of institutional theory. Unlike the stress on 
economic efficiency in universal principal-agent models, institutional theory offers a way of 
understanding how the effectiveness of corporate governance is contingent upon a number of 
organizational, social and political factors.  In illustrating this approach, we have argued that 
the nature and extent of agency conflicts in the firm are shaped by the specific institutional 
environments within which the firm operates. Moreover, the effectiveness of corporate 
governance solutions to various conflicts of interest is far from being universal, as suggested 
by agency-inspired research in economics and finance.  Effectiveness depends on the specific 
formal and informal institutions and how such institutions legitimate and empower different 
sets of stakeholder interests and compromises among the positions of different actors.  
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How should new research begin to further develop a more comparative and 
institutionally embedded governance framework to analyze organizational outcomes of 
various governance practices?  Here we highlight a several key ideas. First, a comparative 
approach must go beyond a thin view of institutions as simply increasing or decreasing 
agency costs.  Rather, a thicker understanding of institutions is needed to identify the salient 
dimensions along which institutions vary (see Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) and how these 
mediate the effectiveness of corporate governance practices.  While many single country case 
studies have generated substantial insights into locally diverse institutions, a large gap 
remains in systematizing this knowledge and developing a more theoretically informed 
comparative understanding of institutions.  For example, future studies may compare the 
governance role of executive compensation in different contexts of emerging economis, such 
as family controlled firms in India or state-controlled Chinese and Russian companies. 
Similarly, it is important to understand what factors underpin board effectiveness in various 
institutional contexts. For example, do independent directors perform significant governance 
roles in family controlled firms in South-East Asia and India or in state-controlled but 
publicly listed companies in Russia and China?   
Second, comparison may help highlight and understand how governance practices 
interact and potentially complement each other as related ‘bundles’. For example, Rediker & 
Seth (1995) suggested that governance factors operate in concert and lead to complementarity 
effects in terms of performance. Aguilera et al. (2008) also focus on interactions between 
governance practices and how these interactions align governance to potentially diverse 
organizational environments.   An important implication is that effectiveness does not result 
from a universal “one best way”, but suggests that particular practices will be effective only in 
certain combinations and specific institutional environments.  This framework can be 
extended further by examining how institutional factors, external to the firm, may also 
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complement internal governance mechanisms. For example, if there is a reputational pressure 
on executives to perform their duties in the interests of shareholders, then the effectiveness of 
executive compensation as a governance factor may have lesser importance. Similarly, strong 
involvement of stakeholders may complement blockholding by limiting the autocratic power 
of dominant shareholders. In short, this framework helps explain why no “one best way” 
exists to achieve effective corporate governance.  Rather, corporate governance arrangements 
may give comparative institutional advantages for different types of firms or economic 
activities (Hall & Soskice, 2001). As a result, recent literature has found more complex or 
surprising combinations of corporate governance variables, than implied by early works that 
focused on a singular effect of a particular mechanism (Aoki & Jackson, 2008).  While 
mapping such combinations of internal governance and external institutions is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the effect of national institutions on corporate governance practices 
clearly goes beyond a simple and linear moderation of the effectiveness of a particular 
governance practice. Future research is needed to explore the complex interplay between 
firm-level and more macro-level institutional aspects of corporate governance. 
Third, interdependence among institutions may also lead to substitution among 
functionally equivalent corporate governance mechanisms. A good example of this relates to 
takeover markets.  In the US and the UK, external governance via the market for corporate 
control plays an important role in disciplining managers by exposing them to a threat of 
takeover. However, hostile takeovers are much less common elsewhere and lack institutional 
legitimacy in many countries (Schneper & Guillen, 2004).  In these settings, external 
governance often takes place within complex and informal networks based on reputation and 
trust (Bachmann, 2001). Can these relationships serve as a substitute to an active market for 
corporate control, especially in institutional environments based on strong networks and 
reputational concerns, such as China?  For example, Globerman et al. (2011) argue that in 
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Asia informal institutions are often more important than formal institutions. Research by 
Wong & Tjosvold (2010) focuses on the effects of informal links, or guanxi, between 
different organizations in China in the context of conflict management. Their results show the 
importance of the governance roles of informal social networks that link an organization with 
its external partners. More specifically, guanxi reduces confrontational approach to conflict 
that, in turn, reduces instances of managerial opportunism and results in partnership 
effectiveness.  Similarly, recent research on Japan suggests that strong relationship-based 
networks may help to channel and mediate market activity in ways that complement the 
corporate governance role of takeovers (Jackson & Miyajima, 2008).   
Previous studies that combine strategic management and institutional research indicate 
that corporate governance often has to compensate or cope with the situation of “institutional 
voids” in emerging economies.  For example, in their analysis of India and Chile, Khanna & 
Palepu (1997; 2000) argue that business group networks serve as a response to institutional 
“voids” resulting from government corruption and poor enforcement of business laws. 
Family-owned business groups often have dubious governance structures associated with poor 
information disclosure and insiders’ abuse of private information even in relatively developed 
emerging stock-markets such as Hong Kong (Filatotchev, Zhang & Piesse, 2011).  But 
institutional change may also be accompanied by a re-configuration of governance practices. 
Looking at BRIC economies, Estrin & Prevezer (2011) argue that in China and some states of 
India, 'substitutive' informal institutions substitute for and replace ineffective formal 
institutions, and they are critical in creating corporate governance leading to enhanced 
domestic and foreign investment. In contrast, Russia is characterized by 'competing' informal 
institutions whereby various informal mechanisms of corporate governance associated with 
corruption and clientelism undermine the functioning of reasonably well set-out formal 
institutions relating to shareholder rights and relations with investors. 
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Fourth, a related implication of institutional theory is associated with the international 
diffusion of corporate governance practices (Gullén, 2004).  For example, policy prescriptions 
enshrined in codes of ‘good’ corporate governance around the world often rely on universal 
notions of ‘best practice,’ which need to be adapted to the local contexts of firms or 
‘translated’ across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazura, 2004; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Fiss & Zajac, 2004).  For example, the U.K. regulators currently 
feel that codes need to be strengthened by greater legislative underpinnings to assure 
enforcement.  However, the fact that the U.K. approach is arguably the less universalistic and 
more contextualized may also help to explain why other countries on the whole have tended 
more to follow the U.K. Codes approach (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazura, 2004).  What is less 
clear is whether these countries have institutional characteristics similar to the U.K. and 
complementary firm-level governance practices that support the effectiveness of these codes.  
For example, Chen, Li & Shapiro (2011) argue that 'good governance practices' in OECD 
countries (e.g., an active board of directors, separation of chairperson and the CEO, 
significant presence of outside directors, and a two-tier board) cannot mitigate the negative 
effect of controlling-shareholder expropriation in Asian emerging economies, since 
governance practices are mainly designed to resolve conflicts between shareholders and the 
management rather than conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Finally, an integration of institutional theory and corporate governance studies 
requires new research methodologies. The main bulk of corporate governance literature uses 
published data from company accounts, or relies on surveys of companies or investors.  Much 
of this research attempts to link the presence of particular corporate governance practices (e.g. 
board committees) with the economic performance of companies (e.g. share price 
performance or profitability). One extension to this approach would involve drawing on new 
innovations in social science, such as set theoretical methods and configurational approaches 
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to organization to examine how corporate governance factors combine and produce different 
outcomes in different institutional contexts (see Fiss, 2007).  Another extension is the need to 
examine how regulatory and informal institutions impact the processes of corporate 
governance itself.  Such process-oriented research would incorporate a more qualitative 
understanding of governance outcomes and take greater account of the actual behavior of key 
participants.  An important correlate to more comparative and institutional views of corporate 
governance is the necessity to collect and triangulate data from a variety of sources – such as 
combining statistical studies based on surveys and published information with follow-up of 
semi-structured interviewing about processes and case studies that look at how these 
processes interact.  While the search for comparative qualitative data about corporate 
governance poses many new research challenges, we submit that this future research agenda 
will lead to better answers to many research questions and help provide a more realistic and 
policy relevant understanding about what makes corporate governance effective. 
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Table 1   
Normative Principal-agent Perspective vs Institutional Corporate Governance Framework 
 
 Principal-Agent Model Institutional CG Framework 
Research focus  Managers  Shareholders  Managers;  Shareholders;  Stakeholders;  Institutional environment 
Organizational 
context 
 Focus on universalistic 
conflict of interests 
between managers and 
shareholders 
 Recognition of differences 
between the extent and nature 
of agency conflicts in various 
institutional environments 
Organizational 
solutions 
 A set of universal 
corporate governance 
remedies, including: 
- board monitoring 
- concentrated ownership; 
- executive incentives; 
- market for corporate 
control 
 Recognition that national 
institutions may impact upon 
the effectiveness of corporate 
governance solutions; some 
of them may have unintended 
consequences 
Account for national 
institutions 
 Context-free approach  Focus on the U.S./U.K. 
environment 
 “Contextualization” of 
agency conflicts  Focus on moderating effects 
of national institutions 
Policy  implications  Convergence of 
institutional frameworks  Universal effectiveness  Law and codes shape 
markets 
 Diversity of institutional 
frameworks  Functional equivalence, 
unintended consequences  Law and codes shape 
networks, associations and 
professional orientations  
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Table 2 
Structure of CEO Remuneration Packages Around the World 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Companies with revenues between $1-3 billion 
Source: Filatotchev and Allcock (2010) 
 
 
Country Base 
Salary 
(%) 
Cash 
bonus (%) 
Incentive Plan 
compensation 
(%) 
USA 23 17 60 
Brazil 27 41 32 
Germany 39 47 14 
UK 40 38 22 
France 44 25 31 
Ireland 44 43 13 
Hong Kong 51 19 30 
Netherlands 51 28 21 
Belgium 52 26 22 
Italy 52 29 19 
Japan 71 12 17 
